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RUSSIA AND LATIN AMERICA
AFTER FEBRUARY 24
By David J. Kramer
February 24 was a day that rocked the European continent, with reverberations felt
worldwide. That, of course, was the day Russia
invaded Ukraine for the second time (the
first occurred in 2014). Several months later, thousands of Ukrainians have been killed,
millions have been displaced, and damage in
the billions of dollars has been inflicted on the
Ukrainian nation.
At the same time, Russia’s military campaign has
been an abysmal failure, as Russian President
Vladimir Putin has not succeeded in decapitating the Ukrainian government, seizing the capital Kyiv, or avoiding massive losses—estimated to be more than 30,000 troops and nearly
a dozen generals. Many democratic countries
have imposed massive sanctions on Putin’s regime and on Russia more broadly. Putin himself
has been sanctioned, making him politically radioactive for all intents and purposes.
The situation remains fluid as this goes to print,
with intense fighting in the east and south of
Ukraine, but it seems that Ukraine, if Western
help increases, could prevail while Russia could
suffer a massive defeat not just on the battlefield but well beyond. Ukrainians have displayed
remarkable courage and determination in defending their land and their freedom. Ukraine
clearly is the victim in this situation; Russia is
the inarguable aggressor and guilty party. And
yet that is not a view shared everywhere, including in Latin America.
While it is too soon to draw concrete conclusions about what the Russian invasion of
Ukraine will mean for Russia’s position in Latin America, here are some preliminary assessments:
1) Maintaining normal relations with Moscow has become much more complicated.
Traveling to Moscow to meet with Putin,
for example, will be much harder to justify for any leader in Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC); the same is true for receiving Russian officials in Latin American
capitals. In addition to Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and most Russian of-
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ficials have been sanctioned. That makes
them persona non grata. Unless and until
the war stops, that status is unlikely to
change. Even then, Latin American governments will need to think twice about
such visits.
2) In light of the massive sanctions regime
imposed on Putin and Russia, dealing and
doing business with Russia are and will
remain more complicated than before.
Russian firms sanctioned by the United
States and other allies are essentially
off-limits for Latin American counterparts
who would otherwise risk being hit with
secondary sanctions, even if countries in
the region have not adopted sanctions
themselves against Russia.
3) Russia’s abysmal military performance in
Ukraine will likely make Russian weapons
and arms less attractive to potential buyers. Poor planning and logistics have had
a lot to do with Russian forces’ inability
to achieve their objectives, but scenes of
Ukrainian tractors pulling damaged and
disabled Russian tanks will not be good
for Russia’s arms business.
4) The fact that Russia is bogged down in
Ukraine means it is less likely to have
the resources—political, economic, military, even human—to extend much further into Latin America. The temptation
to stick it to the United States in what
Moscow perceives as the United States’
sphere of influence will be considerable,
but the ability to match that temptation
with actual capabilities will be limited.
5) As long as Latin American audiences pay
attention to and are afforded factual information about what is happening in
Ukraine, they should see that the propaganda RT en Español and Sputnik have fed
them is pure hogwash. The information
war in the region, in which Russia had
been making real headway, might shift
away from Moscow’s favor.
6) All that said, Latin America’s reaction
to the invasion has been mixed at best.
The lack of a united stance risks creating
openings for Moscow to exploit down the
road.
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Russia’s Invasion Was no Surprise

visit countries in Latin America.

The U.S. intelligence community and other
Western agencies had strong reason to believe
that Putin had decided to invade and made their
predictions public. Putin had massively built up
Russian forces along the border with Ukraine
in spring 2021 and, after a pause and even a
slight pullback of forces for a few months, did
so again in the fall and through the winter in
an even more threatening manner. Putin did this
despite securing a June summit with President
Joseph R. Biden in Geneva, an invitation Biden
had extended to try to forestall the invasion.

For decades, Russia has maintained strong ties
with communist Cuba and the Ortega regime in
Nicaragua. Russian support for Venezuela’s illegitimate leader Nicolás Maduro has been key to
propping him up in power. But for the leaders of
Argentina and Brazil to travel to Moscow as international tensions were heating up over Russia’s growing threat to Ukraine was unseemly.

By early this year, the prospect of a Russian
invasion loomed even larger over Ukraine and
the international stage. And yet two presidents
from Latin America, for reasons still not entirely
clear, decided that February, the month of the
invasion, would be a good time to visit Moscow
and meet with the Russian president. Those
visits by Argentine President Alberto Fernandez
and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro looked
like bad ideas at the time. They look even worse
after Putin gave the green light for Russian forces to invade Ukraine shortly after their visits.
Buddying up to Putin was never a good look for
Latin American leaders, particularly for presidents of two countries that have had good
relations with the United States. And yet both
leaders seemed more interested in striking an
independent stance from Washington than taking a principled stand. Both leaders played right
into the Kremlin’s efforts to use the Latin American card over the United States.
Now, such trips to Moscow should be a thing
of the past. Putin oversees a rogue regime accused of war crimes that no duly elected leader, whether in Latin America or anywhere else
for that matter, should be jetting off to Moscow
to meet. And certainly, hosting Putin or any top
Russian official should not be under consideration for any democracies in the region. Even for
countries with close ties to Moscow, meeting
with top Russian officials would be ill-advised.
Sanctioned Russian officials who might want
to visit Latin America will have difficulty doing
so. When Lavrov sought to travel to Belgrade in
June, he had to scuttle his trip because several countries over which his plane would have
flown denied him clearance. The same would
happen if he or other Russian officials sought to

Returning the Favor
Putin believes that the United States and the
West more broadly—including NATO and the
European Union (EU)—are interfering in Russia’s sphere of influence. Putin’s zero-sum
mentality makes him want to mess with what
he perceives as the United States’ sphere of influence in Latin America. Russian officials even
threatened earlier this year to deploy new military assets in the region in a clear response to
Western pledges of support to Ukraine, a presence that has been growing for years, even before the invasion of Ukraine.1
Russia completely refurbished the Nicaraguan
Armed Forces between 2016 and 2017 and
built and operates a large, high-tech communications facility on the outskirts of its capital,
Managua. Russian strategic bombers have visited Venezuela, and the presence of war vessels in the Caribbean is not unusual. In June,
Nicaragua’s authoritarian leader Daniel Ortega
authorized Russian troops, planes, and ships to
deploy to Nicaragua for training, law enforcement, or emergency response.2 He also permitted small contingents of Russian soldiers in
Nicaragua for an “exchange of experiences and
training.” Whether Russia will follow through on
this is questionable, given how stretched its
forces are in Ukraine, but the announcement
was designed to annoy the United States.
Russia views countries in the region as ripe
targets for expanding military sales. Yet Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine may
dampen the interest in other countries, including Latin America, in obtaining Russian arms.
Indeed, all this may be much more difficult
for Moscow in the aftermath of its invasion of
Ukraine. While there may be an even stronger
desire to enhance its profile in Latin America
in response to Western military assistance to
Ukraine, Russian forces are bogged down in
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Ukraine, where Ukrainians have put up a heroic
and determined fight against the invading forces. That means Russia’s ability to extend its position, send its planes, sell more arms, and prop
up regimes in the region has been compromised. That the United States and many other
democracies have imposed an unprecedented
sanctions regime on Russia means that buying
Russian arms risks violating those sanctions.
That should give Latin American governments
pause.
Moreover, the Kremlin has been forced to recall
Russian forces, including Wagner mercenaries,
from Syria, Libya, and other places to reinforce
their embattled troops in Ukraine.3 That suggests that bolstering Russia’s physical presence
in Latin America, whether through traditional or
non-traditional actors, is unlikely for the foreseeable future. The botched invasion of Ukraine
and the need to scramble to staunch the bleeding there—literally and figuratively—have exposed the limits on Russia’s power projection
capabilities. That is bound to have an impact on
Russia’s profile in Latin America.
Even Russian disinformation and propaganda in
LAC might have to take a back seat to an allhands-on-deck approach to Ukraine. RT en Español, headquartered in Chile, may be strapped
for resources and more limited in its ability to
win over Latin American audiences and sow
doubts about America’s reliability as a partner,
given that RT is struggling to win over audiences closer to home with its twisted propaganda.
The sanctions and their effects on the Russian
economy and revenue streams will make resourcing RT more challenging. Some countries
have even expelled RT from their airwaves and
broadcast networks, a step some democratic governments in Latin America should also
consider. Such a move would not be anti-democratic because Russia is at war with its neighbor, and by extension, with large parts of the
globe. Allowing such a regime to spew its hatefilled and inaccurate rhetoric is morally wrong.
The sanctions regime also threatens Russia’s
ability to maintain its 18 embassies in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Trade with Russia,
with Mexico and Brazil being the largest partners, is also in jeopardy in light of the sanctions.
Aside from military sales, Russian exports consist mostly of metals, fertilizers, and minerals.
In the past 20 years, Russian trade with Lat-
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in America has tripled. Now, as a result of invading Ukraine, it may plummet, cutting off a
desperately needed source of revenue—some
US$14.1 billion in 2019—at a time when Russian sources of income are drying up. For Latin
American companies, doing business in Russia
or with Russian companies in their countries
has become very complicated and risks incurring significant costs through secondary sanctions.
China and other resource-rich countries may
look to fill the void, and the United States would
be wise to tap into some of these newly-opened
market opportunities. At the same time, some
Latin American countries may benefit,4 at least
in the short term, from the growing food crisis
caused by Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea. Argentina, a major wheat
exporter, may try to fill the gap left by impediments to exports of Ukrainian wheat, for example.
The goodwill produced by deliveries of Russian-manufactured COVID vaccines, known
as Sputnik, during the pandemic—part of its
vaccine diplomacy competition with the United States—is unlikely to mitigate the damage
done to Russia’s reputation from the invasion of
Ukraine. As it is, questions about the efficacy of
the Russian vaccines raised doubts about Moscow as a reliable partner in public health.
Test in the United Nations
A month after the invasion of Ukraine, countries around the world faced a test of where
they stood: with Kyiv or Moscow. In a March 24
vote before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on whether to condemn Russia for
its actions, 140 countries voted with the resolution, 39 abstained, and five voted against
it. Among Latin American and Caribbean countries, none voted against the resolution, leaving
Russia with only Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea
and Syria. Four Latin American countries—Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, and Nicaragua—voted
to abstain.
Voting in favor of the resolution were 27 LAC
countries. Two countries—Dominica and Venezuela—did not vote (Venezuela lost its right to
vote for non-payment of UN dues). Such a result could not have pleased Moscow and would
suggest either that its investment to win over
countries in Latin America was not working or
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that its invasion was so beyond the pale that
even countries normally sympathetic to Russia
had no choice but to vote to condemn or abstain.
Another test came a few weeks later when the
UNGA voted on whether to expel Russia from its
seat on the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC).
And while Russia still lost that vote, it did so
with fewer countries opposed to it than in the
previous UNGA resolution. To be clear, Russia’s
membership in the UNHRC makes a mockery
of the institution, given the country’s appalling
human rights record, as it teeters from being
authoritarian to totalitarian. That said, only 93
countries felt Russia’s invasion of Ukraine merited it being kicked off the UNHRC; 24 voted
against and 58 abstained.
A look at how countries in Latin America and
the Caribbean voted shows more support for
Russia on this vote compared to the vote in
late March. Nineteen countries voted in favor
of kicking Russia off the Human Rights Council.
Cuba joined Bolivia and Nicaragua as the only
countries in the region to oppose the resolution. Ten countries from the region abstained:
El Salvador, Mexico, Brazil (perhaps reflecting a
benefit for Moscow from Bolsonaro’s February
visit), Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Both Brazil and
Mexico hold seats on the UN Security Council.
Some countries such as Cuba and Nicaragua—
like Russia are members of the UNHRC—may
have worried about facing similar scrutiny and
losing their seats on it in the future.
Challenges to Maintaining Unity Against
Russia
Over time, maintaining unity, including a tough
sanctions regime against Moscow, may prove
challenging, especially as the war has an
impact on energy and food supplies around
the world. A report issued jointly by the UN
World Food Program and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) warned that the effects of
the Ukraine crisis might soon exacerbate food
insecurity in the Caribbean region.5 Inflation, a
problem before February 24, has been made
worse by the invasion, which may trigger some
outside powers to encourage a negotiated
settlement to stop the fighting. The Ukrainians, however, are confident in their ability to

prevail in the conflict. In a recent survey,6 97
percent expressed confidence that Ukraine will
prevail—and are determined to push Russian
forces off their territory. That suggests the
conflict could drag on for a while—unless the
Russian side experiences a total breakdown
and collapse, a possibility that cannot be ruled
out.
For the United States, relying on Russia to
self-destruct and weaken its position in Latin
America is insufficient. The Biden administration needs to pursue an active campaign to undermine Russia’s standing in the region. Recent
U.S. overtures to Cuba and Venezuela may be
the first steps in such a strategy to try to drive
a wedge between Moscow and its two closest
allies in the region. Whether that is the right approach, disputes between Washington and Latin American counterparts over the agenda and
invitation list for the U.S.-hosted June Summit
of the Americas showcased disagreements between Washington and LAC countries that don’t
bode well for the administration’s efforts to enhance its position at Moscow’s expense.
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, usually strong
critics of intervention in general, voted against
Russia in the two resolutions before the UN
Security Council, but none of them has joined
other democracies in imposing sanctions on
the Putin regime. Nor have they suspended military, cultural, and sports ties with Moscow. In
late April, all three abstained on a resolution at
the Organization of American States that suspended Russia as a permanent observer of the
34-country group; 25 countries voted to do so.
In Brazil, Bolsonaro’s visit to Moscow would
seem a ripe subject for criticism in the upcoming election, but his primary challenger’s
views on Russia’s invasion do not appear any
better. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva told Time magazine in early May that the United States, EU,
and Ukraine itself bear as much responsibility
for the war as Putin.7 “Putin shouldn’t have invaded Ukraine,” Lula said, “But it’s not just Putin who is guilty. The U.S. and the EU are also
guilty. What was the reason for the Ukraine invasion? NATO? Then the U.S. and Europe should
have said: ‘Ukraine won’t join NATO.’ That would
have solved the problem,” he said, almost parroting Kremlin talking points. He went on to
blast Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
claiming, “This guy [Zelenskyy] is as respon-
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sible as Putin for the war. Because in the war,
there’s not just one person guilty … He did want
war.” Therefore, a change in leadership in Brazil
after elections this fall might not produce much
change in Brazilian views toward Russia.
In Mexico, MORENA, the party of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, in a politically tonedeaf step, launched a Mexico-Russia “Friendship
Committee” in March—after Russia’s invasion.
At a ceremony for the launch of the committee,
as reported by Andres Oppenheimer, Russian
Ambassador Viktor Koronelli was the honored
guest at the ceremony, where he praised López
Obrador’s self-proclaimed neutrality on the
conflict.8 In his daily press briefing that same
day, López Obrador said, “Our posture is neutrality.”
Conclusion
For countries in Latin America claiming to be
democratic, neutrality simply is the wrong
stance to take. Contrary to the view of Lula and
others, responsibility for the crisis lies squarely on Russia’s shoulders. Neither Ukraine, NATO,
nor the EU did anything to warrant such a barbarous attack that has included clear evidence
of war crimes and crimes against humanity.9 The
invasion represents a clear violation of Ukraine’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Maintaining
a position of neutrality on this issue is tantamount to supporting the Kremlin.
The United States needs to do a better job of
encouraging more support from Latin American
allies for a hardline position toward Moscow.
It must make clear the choice countries in the
region face. Through quiet diplomacy as well as
naming and shaming when and where necessary, Washington should plainly state that when
it comes to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, now
is the time to choose sides—and that the right
side to be on is with Ukraine and the democratic
countries that have rallied behind it.
Such an approach should entail a more aggressive effort to provide factual news and information to the region about what Russia is really up
to in Ukraine—the war crimes and slaughter of
innocent civilians—through a more aggressive
public diplomacy campaign, including ramping
up internet and broadcasting efforts. Washington should urge friendly LAC governments to
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cut off access for RT en Español since its purpose is to spread dangerous propaganda, not
real news.
The United States needs to encourage more investment and business in LAC to step in where
Russian activity has ceased or become problematic. The alternative otherwise might come
from Beijing, which is already working to extend
its influence in the region in place of Russia’s.
Indeed, China is likely to move quickly to try to
fill any openings created by Moscow’s distraction in Ukraine. That argues even more for a
proactive campaign by the United States to fill
those gaps and not let China do so. The United
States cannot passively sit back and hope that
Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine will create
opportunities it can take advantage of. It must
ramp up its game and seize this moment in the
hemisphere before others do.

David J. Kramer is the Bradford M. Freeman Managing Director of Global Policy at the George W.
Bush Institute and former Assistant Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
in the George W. Bush administration. He also is
a Senior Fellow in the Steven J. Green School of
International and Public Affairs at FIU.
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WAR IN UKRAINE WILL LEAD
TO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN
RUSSIAN-LATIN AMERICAN
RELATIONS
By Vladimir Rouvinski
Introduction
The Russian war in Ukraine came as a surprise
to many decision-makers in Latin America and
the Caribbean (LAC). Despite the growing concentration of Russian troops on the border before the attack and the public warnings by the
U.S. government on the war’s inevitability, the
scale of the invasion and the changing justifications offered by the government of Russian
President Vladimir Putin to explain the unprovoked attack of the neighboring nation made it
difficult for many political leaders in the region
to take a firm stand regarding Russian warfare
in Europe swiftly. In addition, there were other
reasons for the indecisiveness of a number of
Latin American nations.
On the one hand, shortly before the war began, the leaders of Argentina and Brazil went to
Russia and expressed their support for Putin’s
foreign policy.1 At the same time, Russia’s First
Prime Minister Yury Borisov visited Venezuela,
Nicaragua, and Cuba just days before the war
started and promised to broaden military cooperation with vital Russian allies in the Western
Hemisphere.2 Therefore, in the context of the
unfolding war in Ukraine, the leaders of Brazil
and Argentina experienced difficulties finding a way to distance themselves from Russia,
at least during the initial phase of the war. In
contrast, while expressing their support to Putin, Caracas, Managua, and Havana had to be
careful not to give the impression that the war
in Ukraine may be extended speedily to the region, using their nations as Russia’s gateway.
On the other hand, traditional U.S. allies in the
region like Colombia used the crisis in Ukraine
as an opportunity to reconfirm their commitment to the established world order and offered
unconditional approval of the U.S. and European
position about the conflict.3 Still, while Bogota’s
rhetoric was met by fury in Moscow and the
Russian envoy to the United Nations (UN) used
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the presentation by the Colombian president at
the UN Security Council (UNSC) to attack Colombia directly,4 the Colombian government did
not turn its words into action. Colombia continued to maintain its diplomatic and trade relations with Russia.
Against the above background, the lack of consensus among important Latin American nations on the Russian war in Ukraine benefited
Moscow by offering the Kremlin an opportunity
to claim that the United States and the Western
powers failed to achieve the desired isolation
of Russia in the international arena.5 Although
recent revelations about atrocities committed
by the Russian troops in Ukraine forced some
indecisive Latin American governments to condemn Russia’s modus operandi publicly, to date,
not one nation in the region has taken full-scale
measures similar to those adopted by the U.S.
and European governments.
For instance, no Latin American country expelled
Russian diplomats, despite the latter having
disseminated misleading Russian narratives
about the war. The Russian government-controlled media outlets have continued their information operations in the region. No Latin
American nation has joined the United States,
Europe, and several other countries worldwide
by introducing economic sanctions against
Moscow. Moreover, the shifting political pattern
in the region toward the left and the growing
popularity of the “active non-alliance” approach
as an alternative foreign policy strategy6 offers
Russia the potential to use its relations with
this part of the Western Hemisphere to continue advancing Moscow’s reciprocity strategy,7 a
driving force behind Russia’s engagement with
the region during the last two decades. After all,
since Latin American countries do not consider
their security directly threatened by the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, and some continue to view
the Russian market as potentially beneficial,
governments in the region took a wait-and-see
attitude. At the same time, to better understand
the reasons behind the reaction of Latin America to the war in Ukraine and future scenarios,
it is necessary to take a closer look at some of
the bilateral relations built by post-Soviet Russia with LAC nations.
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The Impact of the War in Ukraine on Russia’s
Bilateral Relations in Latin America
Concerning Russia’s engagement with the region after the Cold War, two groups of countries
can be distinguished by considering the most
critical aspects of their bilateral relations with
Moscow. The first group includes Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Russia has attempted to
forge multifaceted connections with the trio, including economic and military cooperation, and
has developed strong political ties. However,
the majority of Latin American states belong to
the second group, which has stable economic
relations with Russia, although unequal in terms
of trade and commerce. Yet, the degree of their
political cooperation is mainly dependent on the
ideological preferences of the successive governments. This is the case for Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico, some of the most important actors
in the region. Moreover, the victory of the leftwing candidate Gustavo Petro in the Colombian
presidential elections in June 2022 may lead to
changes in Colombia’s foreign policy. As shown
below, challenges and opportunities can be
identified for members of both groups.
Venezuela
For the last 20 years, Venezuela has served as
Moscow’s gateway to the region and become a
vital part of the Kremlin’s reciprocity strategy.
In exchange for the Chavista government’s full
support of Russia’s 2008 war in the Caucasus
and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Moscow supplied weapons to the Venezuelan army,
while Russian private and state-owned companies invested heavily in the Venezuelan energy
sector.8 Later on, Putin’s Russia offered a lifeline to Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro government
by making multibillion-dollar advance payments
for Venezuelan oil and helping Venezuela bypass U.S. sanctions.9 In 2019, Russia sent military technical personnel to the South American
country, thus confirming Putin’s commitment to
keeping Venezuela in the Russian orbit.10 As a
result, during the presidency of Donald J. Trump,
the United States had to recognize Russia as a
key player in the Venezuelan scenario through
direct bilateral negotiations between the United
States and Russia on Venezuela.11

Yet, the Russian advance to Venezuela came
at a price: In 2020, Rosneft had to abandon all
its assets in the country under U.S. pressure.
Although Russia managed to transfer Rosneft’s holdings to a shadow Russia’s government-owned company, it evidenced the vulnerability of Moscow’s engagement and cast
doubts on the continuation of tangible Russian
support to Venezuela. When Russia invaded
Ukraine, Caracas approved the Russian standing in the war.12 At the same time, Venezuela
agreed to start negotiations with the United
States in March 2022, which represented a significant setback for Russian interests and may
signal a potential change in full-scale Venezuelan commitment to the Kremlin.13 The fact is that
the Kremlin is rapidly losing its former attractiveness to the Maduro regime as a middleman
who helped smuggle Venezuelan oil and provided other material support. Russian appeal
as a powerful nation that could back Venezuela
in the international arena has also diminished
following the exclusion of Moscow from many
important international structures, including
the UN Human Rights Council.14 Therefore, it is
unlikely that Russian-Venezuelan relations will
continue as they were after the 2022 Ukrainian
war.
Due to changing U.S. policy toward Venezuela in
the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine, Maduro has new opportunities to balance Russian
influence by establishing working contacts with
Washington, which are emerging due to U.S.
concerns regarding the availability of oil and
Venezuela as part of a possible solution.15 In this
scenario, the Putin government would need to
make an extra effort to keep the alliance strong.
However, considering the impact of Western
sanctions and the costs associated with the
war in Ukraine, Russian material capacities are
more limited. Therefore, it would be difficult for
Moscow to allocate new tangible resources that
Maduro wishes for—including expanded military cooperation—while other states may be
willing to restart their economic relations with
Caracas, even if only partially. Hence, the future
of Russian-Venezuelan relations is in jeopardy.
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Nicaragua
In the case of Nicaragua, in the recent past,
the government of President Daniel Ortega has
developed a great degree of dependence on
Russian political support, and there are Russian
military training installations on Nicaraguan soil.
Nonetheless, Russian relations with Nicaragua
are suffering from the limitation of tangible resources, similar to Venezuela. For that reason,
the switch of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in late 2021 and Managua’s abstention in voting on the UN General Assembly
resolution condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine
(China did the same)16 evidences the change in
Nicaragua’s approach to Russia and its willingness to strengthen further collaboration with
Beijing. Another indication of Managua’s changing course in its relations with Russia is that
Ortega refused to meet Russian Duma Speaker
Vyacheslav Volodin, who arrived in Nicaragua
for an official visit on February 24, 2022, the
day Russia attacked Ukraine.17 As in the case
of Venezuela, Russia has to demonstrate that
it remains useful to Managua in the emerging
regional and global political and economic arrangements. The Ortega government became
accustomed to rewards from the Kremlin, political and economic, for small but symbolically
significant—for Russia—gestures like the 2008
diplomatic recognition of Georgia’s separatist
regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and for
opening Nicaraguan ports for Russian military
vessels. However, the experienced ruler of Nicaragua would prefer to wait until the economically-weakened Putin government can prove it
is still capable of rewarding Ortega for his support of Russian actions in Ukraine.18
Cuba
Russia´s war in Ukraine resulted in challenges
and opportunities for Russian-Cuban relations.
From the beginning of the invasion, the position of Havana has been purposefully ambiguous. While the government of Miguel Diaz-Canel
lamented the loss of human lives in Ukraine,
Cuba abstained from condemning Russia explicitly for these losses.19 This is because Havana cannot afford to distance itself too much
from Russia: Cuba uses its ties with Putin’s Russia to balance Cuban relations with the United
States. Therefore, Cuba avoids openly criticizing Russia and maintains an ambiguous political
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narrative, keeping the maneuvering space wide
open.
At the same time, like Venezuela and Nicaragua,
Havana is aware of the limitations in obtaining
aid from Russia, which it desperately needs to
keep the troubled Cuban economy afloat. While
several joint projects had been announced before the war in Ukraine started, there are reasonable doubts they will be implemented under
the current circumstances. In addition, highly
publicized Russian aid to Cuba has had little real
impact on the improvement of ordinary Cubans’
living conditions in the long term.20 Besides, the
statements by some high-level Russian diplomats about the possibility of placing offensive
weapons on the island21 were deemed irresponsible by Cubans.22 The suggestions about
expanding Russia’s military presence on the island did not develop further. In addition, Cuba
and Ukraine maintain diplomatic relations.23
Cuba is likely to look for new opportunities to
improve its relations with the United States and
not expose itself to the risks associated with
Russian interests in the Western Hemisphere.
For example, despite Moscow expressing its
interest in developing closer ties with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
(ALBA), controlled by Cuba and Venezuela, Russia was not invited to ALBA’s May 22 summit
in Havana. Moreover, while the summit’s final
declaration did not explicitly mention the war
in Ukraine, it did state the need for a peaceful
resolution of international conflicts, which can
be interpreted as the disapproval of the Russian
military invasion in Ukraine.24
Mexico
The divisions by ideological lines in contemporary Mexican politics echoed Mexico’s reaction
to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moscow has
many supporters among the ruling MORENA
party, to which President Andrés Manuel López
Obrador belongs. This is one reason why Russia
continues to have opportunities to engage Mexican public opinion with its narratives regarding
the war in Ukraine. For instance, in March 2022,
the Mexican parliament hosted a special session to celebrate the work of the Mexico-Russia
interparliamentary commission. Russian diplomats joined pro-Russian Mexican deputies
condemning the U.S. policy, which they claim
led to the war in Ukraine.25 Russian and Mex-
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ican mass media provided extensive reporting
on this event, allowing Moscow to expose its
position to millions of Mexicans. However, the
government of López Obrador also had to consider Mexican economic dependence on the
United States and chose to become a sponsor,
together with France, of the UN General Assembly resolution demanding the end of the war in
Ukraine.26 In the future, Mexico will likely limit
engagement with Russia because of the importance of the U.S. factor in its international and
domestic policies.
Argentina
In many aspects, Argentina shares Russia’s position on the need for power rearrangements on
the global stage. In this context, and although
Argentinian President Alberto Fernandez eventually condemned the Russian aggression in
Ukraine, he nevertheless allowed the Russian
Embassy in Argentina and Russian media outlets to disseminate Moscow’s official discourse
freely to Argentinians. Moreover, Argentina sustained plans for economic collaboration with
Russia and continues other interactions such
as cultural and education cooperation. Overall,
the government of Argentina tilted the balance
more toward the acquittal of the actions of the
Russian government than defending the human
rights of Ukrainians. In this respect, Fernández’s
position differs sharply from the United States
and other Western countries, allowing Russia
to mislead ordinary Argentinians regarding its
goals in Ukraine.
Brazil
Brazil is amid an electoral campaign, and the
current President, Jair Bolosonaro, is seeking reelection. At the same time, his country
depends on Russia’s critical supply of fertilizers.27 Likewise, given the high degree of uncertainty regarding the war’s outcome in Ukraine
and emerging new power alignments, Brazil is
interested in continuing BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa) as a symbol of
Brazil’s global reach. This is one of the reasons
why Brasilia evaded providing full support to
the United States and its Western allies and did
not impose any sanctions on Russia. The statements by the Brazilian president are identical
to those of other Brazilian officials and call for
“thoughtfulness” and “neutrality.” Bolsonaro

has been timid in his reaction to the invasion,
and today, many in Latin America perceive that
his government endorses Russia’s intervention
in Ukraine.
Colombia
Gustavo Petro’s victory in the June 2022 presidential elections will undoubtedly lead to
changes in the foreign policy of Colombia. For
the first time, a leader of the left has risen to the
pinnacle of political power in this nation, which
has long been the most committed US ally in
the region. In particular, the new president is
expected to restore diplomatic relations with
Venezuela,28 which will mean bolstering the legitimacy of the Maduro regime in the international arena and a new challenge to the efforts
of democratic governments around the world to
promote the return of democracy to the embattled nation.
At the same time, judging by Petro’s proposed
foreign policy program, the new Colombian
president does not intend to radically change
the Colombian line regarding relations with the
United States. Among the main items on Petro’s agenda of relations with the United States29
are the fight against illegal drug trafficking, the
rule of law, and the strengthening of democracy. In addition, Colombia and the United States
have stable contacts between political, economic, and military institutions that cannot be
destroyed overnight. Moreover, according to the
data available to the author of this report, the
foreign policy advisers of the new president are
leading experts in international relations who
reject the discourse of Putin’s Russia, condemn
the war in Ukraine, and understand the nature
of the existing regime in Russia. After all, Putin
personifies those ideals that Petro constantly
rejects, including disrespect for human rights,
illegal enrichment of political elites, persecution
of political opposition, and the use of military
force to achieve foreign policy goals. In this
context, it seems likely that despite the change
in the ideological vector of the political leadership of Colombia, the increase in Russian influence in Colombia due to Bogotá’s left turn will
be limited.
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The Impact of the War in Ukraine on the Russian Modus Operandi in Latin America
Before the war in Ukraine, Russia used various
means to advance its strategy in Latin America:
foreign trade and economic cooperation, arms
trade, limited but timely aid to its key allies,
visits by heads of states and other top government officials, Russian diaspora associations
affiliated with Russian embassies, and public
diplomacy (including cultural and educational
exchanges). Regarding various aspects of Russia’s multidimensional engagement with Latin
America, it is too early to evaluate the medium and long-term impact of the war. However,
Russian-Latin American relations will likely experience significant changes in the near future.
While new trends will become more visible once
Russia and LAC countries adjust their foreign
policies accordingly, it is possible to identify the
key factors that will shape the future scenario.
The first factor is the drastically reduced capacity of Moscow to offer attractive incentives for
foreign trade and economic cooperation for LAC
countries because of the unprecedented sanctions imposed by the United States and Europe.
The second is limited capacity to provide tangible support combined with political backing
in the international arena to Russia’s traditional
allies since Putin’s priority will be addressing
economic problems inside Russia while facing
growing international isolation. The third factor is the dependence of various Latin American nations on Russian supplies such as armaments and fertilizers. Russia is aware of this
and will undoubtedly attempt not to allow this
to change. The fourth factor is the degree of the
wiliness of Russian political elites to continue
to use LAC for reciprocal, albeit primarily symbolic gestures in response to the U.S. policy in
Ukraine, Russia’s “near abroad.” From this perspective, if the conflict in Ukraine intensifies,
Putin may attempt to increase Russia’s presence in the region. Still, it would have to consider the previous three factors. In this context,
the evidence suggests that, for now, Moscow
would rely primarily on strategic communication using the established channels that remain
readily available and affordable.
For years, strategic communication has been
one of the most reliable instruments in achieving Moscow’s goals. The Kremlin uses it as a
tool of sharp power30 that attempts to increase
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the polarization of Latin American societies. As
evidenced by the cases of Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina, many Latin Americans agree with the
Russian narrative that the war in Ukraine is part
of an effort to build a new multipolar world order. The idea that their governments must conduct a foreign policy more independent from
the position promoted by the United States resonates with the view of many people in the region. Aware of this trend, Russia intensified its
strategic communication in LAC after the war in
Ukraine had begun. In particular, Russian diplomats actively engage local political figures and
public opinion to disseminate the Russian version of the events in Ukraine.
Russia is constantly searching for ways to bypass the limitations imposed by some Western
companies, such as YouTube and Twitter. It finds
a way to retransmit its programs via newly created accounts in Telegram, secondary accounts
on YouTube, and traditional channels like RT en
Español on Facebook, which had more than 18
million followers as of May 2022. The webpage
of RT Actualidad31 is freely available everywhere
in LAC. Besides, contrary to the United States
and Europe, where authorities have taken measures to limit the exposure of their societies to
Russian propaganda, Latin America witnessed
the introduction of only limited restrictions imposed mostly by private companies.32 In addition, Russia’s diaspora associations affiliated
with Russian embassies did not stop their activities. Many Russian diaspora social network
groups support the Russian war in Ukraine,
publishing news and reports from the Russian
government’s news agencies. From this perspective, and even though the exact data is unavailable, there is little doubt that Russia still
possesses the necessary capabilities to continue exposing Latin Americans to its information
coverage.
Opportunities for the United States
The impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine on Latin
America offers new opportunities for the United
States. One is to review previous approaches to
the countries serving as Russia’s gateways to
the region. Since Moscow’s capacity to provide
economic and political support to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela has significantly diminished,
they may be willing to adopt new strategies in
their bilateral relations with the United States.
This is particularly evident in the case of Vene-
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zuela, where limited U.S. engagement in the energy sector could become a game-changer and,
eventually, reduce other security threats, such
as illegal drug trafficking. Besides, the reactivation of the oil sector will likely alleviate the
living conditions of ordinary Venezuelans and
pave the way for a possible power transition.
Similarly, this step would improve U.S. energy
security and directly benefit U.S. companies
and citizens.
Additionally, if the United States wants Latin
America to adopt a more meaningful strategy in
terms of economic sanctions, Washington has
to consider that LAC governments have been
using sanctions as a foreign policy tool mainly in regional scenarios, like the recent crisis
in Venezuela, since their direct impact could
include refugee flows, economic damage, and
the violation of democratic norms established
in the Western Hemisphere. On the other hand,
recent studies show that Latin American governments are likely to subscribe to an economic
sanctions regime if it has the approval of the
UNSC, which would be difficult to achieve, given
Russia’s veto power.33

a strategy would include seizing opportunities
to implement the type of disinformation campaigns regularly conducted by Moscow through
government-controlled media outlets and Russian embassies.

Vladimir Rouvinski is Director, Laboratory of Politics and International Relations (PoInt), and Associate Professor, Department of Political Studies, at Icesi University in Cali, Colombia. He is a
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In the case of other Latin American nations, it
is essential to remember that one of the factors that allowed Russia to advance its Latin
American policy is the narrative of building a
new world order that could benefit Latin America, combined with the perception held by many
Latin Americans that the region is no longer a
U.S. priority. In this context, introducing a coordinated U.S.-Latin American communication strategy emphasizing the value of shared
U.S.-Latin American interests combined with
high-level public events would make it more
difficult for Russia to continue exploiting anti-U.S. sentiments. On top of that, broad information coverage of U.S.-Latin American
cooperation in cybersecurity, countering transnational organized crime, and offsetting illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing, for example, would help stress the value of “having
Americans as friends” for both elites and wider Latin American societies. After all, the war
in Ukraine demonstrated clearly that the Putin
regime seeks not to help build a new world order but to carry out an expansionist agenda.
That is why an information strategy that would
challenge the Russian narrative combined with
public diplomacy could significantly improve the
image of the United States in the region. Such
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RUSSIAN INVASION OF
UKRAINE SPARKS RANGE OF
REACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN
By Andrei Serbin Pont
The initiation of Russia´s “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine caused a shockwave that
left no region in the world untouched as international surprise led to various reactions by
national governments of different political and
ideological inclinations. As such, Latin America
and the Caribbean (LAC) was no exception. The
region has been fertile terrain for Russian diplomatic1 and military engagement over the last
two decades, and several countries have found
Russia a credible partner and supplier of a wide
range of goods and services. Additionally, the
reactions to Russian intervention in Ukraine
have not been homogenous, even at national
levels.
In the first hours of the invasion, several countries took a strong stance against the Russian
military offensive. On February 24, Colombia´s
President Ivan Duque expressed that Colombia
categorically rejected “the premeditated and
unjustified attack that has been perpetrated
against the Ukrainian people by Russia, which
not only undermines its sovereignty but also
threatens world peace.”
Then-Chilean President-Elect Gabriel Boric said
on his Twitter account, “Russia has opted for
war as a means of resolving conflicts. From
Chile we condemn the invasion of Ukraine, the
violation of its sovereignty, and the illegitimate
use of force. Our solidarity will be with the victims and our humble efforts with peace.”2 Foreign Minister Carolina Valdivia said Chile would
support the sanctions approved by the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC)3. Boric´s position was of particular relevance. “Anti-imperialism” discourse is deeply rooted in the region,
yet the invasion of Ukraine created discomfort
for those who do not align with “hard” Bolivarianism, as is the case of Boric’s government,
representing a departure from the political culture of the “old left.”

Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Juan Carlos Holguín said that Russian President Vladimir Putin had violated international law, in a similar
stance taken by the Foreign Ministry of Peru,
which expressed its concern and called for an
end to hostilities, while the foreign minister of
Paraguay called for dialogue and a ceasefire.
Among the initially contradicting positions was
Mexico´s government as President Andrés Manuel López Obrador called for dialogue4, while
his Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard adopted a
tougher stance, condemning the invasion and
demanding that Russia end its military operations in Ukraine5. At the UNSC, Mexico’s representative stated that “Mexico will strongly condemn the invasion of which Ukraine has been
a victim” and voted in favor of a U.S. resolution
condemning the invasion6. Ebrard also authored
a proposal for the UN General Assembly’s Emergency Special Session on Ukraine that included an “immediate cessation of hostilities in
Ukraine,” and the “establishment of diplomatic
space to resolve conflict and the start of humanitarian aid.”7
A similar case was Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who, a week after his February 2022
meeting with Putin in Moscow, initially made
no mention of the Ukraine crisis, coming under
heavy criticism from the United States, saying
during his visit that he was “in solidarity with
Russia.”8 During a press conference, Bolsonaro stated, “We are not going to take sides. We
are going to continue to be neutral and help
however possible to find a solution” and highlighted Brazil’s ties to Russian oil and fertilizers.
In contrast, Brazilian Vice President Hamilton
Mourao condemned the military invasion and
said that economic sanctions on Russia may
not be enough and that the West may need to
use force against this country9. Mourao also
called for a cessation of hostilities and said that
as a member of the UNSC, he would act to find
a peaceful solution. On February 25, Brazil was
one of 11 of the UNSC’s 15 members to vote on
a U.S.-authored resolution to condemn Russia10.
The Brazilian positions present ambivalences
such as those we see in populist movements on
a global scale and showcase Putin´s ability to
resonate with left- or right-leaning authoritarian governments; the shared ideological premise
is illiberalism.
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Like the case with Brazil, the Argentine foreign
ministry sent formal expressions of disapproval of the invasion, and the president has slowly
shifted his rhetoric to refer to Russia´s actions
as an invasion. Yet, Argentina has taken a favorable position to Russian interests in votes
held within the Organization of America States
(OAS), while it has taken more critical positions
in broader multilateral spaces such as the United Nations, particularly in Geneva. In part, this
could be attributable to internal disputes within
the Argentine government, as well as distinct
diplomatic leadership in both organizations.
In the early stages of the war, Cuba did not directly address the invasion, although the Cuban
government criticized the United States for imposing “the progressive expansion of NATO toward the borders of the Russian Federation”11
before the offensive. In Venezuela, Foreign
Minister Félix Plasencia supported Russia´s
“fight against what he said was NATO’s desire
for war,” but later, the Venezuelan government
made a call “to return to the path of diplomatic
understanding” in the face of the crisis.
Overall, the trend in the region has been relatively straightforward, even considering the
ongoing contradictions in some countries’ positions. This allows us to categorize regional reactions into three groups:
1) Those that have consolidated a long-standing partnership with Russia over the past decades (e.g., Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela)
have expressed support for Putin´s actions in
Ukraine in multilateral forums and have instrumentalized rhetoric on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention to support Russia
in multilateral forums and avoid condemning
the invasion.
2) Those who have condemned the invasion
(e.g., Chile and Colombia), whose positions have
been reflected within the framework of multilateral organizations.
3) Those who have tried to project neutrality,
despite their votes not reflecting it. Many have
been willing to take critical positions, although
they cautiously select international multilateral
instances to express condemnation or support.
This is exemplified by Argentina taking a softer stance on Russia at the OAS while leading
more robust initiatives at the UN Human Rights
Council.
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The region´s historic positions regarding strong
support of national sovereignty and emphasis
on non-intervention have been made clear in
almost all declarations, even those coming from
close partners and allies of Russia. These critical historical and normative elements are difficult to put aside. This is especially the case for
governments that have propelled regional policies to reduce foreign intervention, build and
consolidate regional integration, and reinforce
multilateral mechanisms to strengthen respect
for national sovereignty and avoid its violation
by foreign powers (mostly portrayed as the
threat of U.S. intervention).
As pointed out by Sanahuja, Stefanoni, and
Verdes-Montenegro,12 two crucial factors have
consistently influenced recent Latin American
positions in a singular regionally-specific way.
These countries were still immersed in managing a pandemic and its socioeconomic effects,
leading to detachment from mainstream positions in Europe and the United States and the
perception of this conflict as “a new war on
the ‘old continent,’ far from its most direct interests.” That has an impact more focused on
the European order rather than the international system. Yet, as explained by Urzúa Valverde
and Pauselli,13 Latin American countries value
international law because it gives them a clear
regulatory framework and restricts the abuses
of the most powerful states. Such a weakening of international norms today would mean it
would not be that costly for any country to act
against them in the future and is therefore consistent with the long-term interests of the LAC
countries.
The War´s Economic Impact on the Region
In the post-invasion period, Russian activity in
the region was not deeply impacted, partly because, as Rodriguez points out,14 there is a profound Latin American reticence to impose sanctions against Russia. There is a preference for
designing collective responses to controversies
through multilateral forums that emphasize pacific solutions following international law rather than economic measures enacted without
the approval of a multilateral organization. Yet,
even if consensus were built around economic
sanctions from the region, the impact would be
minimal.
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Initially, Russian exports to the region were impacted, leading to a fertilizer shortage. Data
compiled by Bloomberg’s Green Markets shows
prices soared so high that farmers halted buying, but now the market has flipped leading
to fertilizer supplies piling up in ports15. Brazil
went through great diplomatic efforts to avoid
disputes with Russia that could affect its strategic interest in the supply of this much-needed item. Fertilizer exports do not impact Brazil
exclusively. Argentina, among other countries,
is affected, as this good represents around 40
percent of Russian shipments to the region.
Steel is also a relevant export, mainly to Brazil
and Mexico, that could have a strategic industrial impact on these economies. Overall, it is
important to remember that trade with Russia
represents less than 1.5 percent of the total exports of goods from the region.16

Venezuela may benefit as oil prices rise. Something similar may happen with large agricultural
exporters like Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in
the short term, and maybe in the medium term,
as long as they can overcome reduced access
to fertilizers.

This leaves Russian economic activity relatively unaffected compared to other regions, yet
Russia’s presence in diplomatic and military
spheres is critical. On the diplomatic front, on
April 21, 2022, the OAS adopted a resolution
suspending Russia as a permanent observer
to the intergovernmental institution due to its
invasion of Ukraine. With no votes against the
resolution, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico abstained, reflecting the aforementioned ambivalences in their country’s positions on Russia
and their interest in not disrupting a partnership that provides goods crucial to their economies. In the case of Argentina, divisions within the ministry of foreign affairs have also had
an impact. While Ambassador Carlos Raimundo
represents Argentina in the OAS, close to Kirchnerismo´s hardliners, in the UN offices in Geneva, Ambassador Federico Villegas is a diplomat with a long legacy of work in the human
rights sphere. This helps explain the divergent
positions between Argentine votes at the OAS
in contrast with its positions at the UN. Also,
within the UN, Mexico and Brazil are currently serving two-year terms as non-permanent
members of the UNSC, where their career diplomats have criticized Russia.

Russian Media and Regional Perceptions

Overall, the war is leading to uneven and divergent macroeconomic trends in Latin America as
global commodity prices are putting pressure
on inflation, not only because of the rise in energy prices but also because of the increase in
agricultural prices. In the realm of oil exports,
countries like Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and

A recurring question is on Venezuela´s prospects as an alternative to Russia’s 7.8 million
barrels per day (b/d) of oil. Currently, Venezuela
is producing 700,000 to 800,000 b/d, although,
at its peak, it was producing more than 3 million
b/d. As such, the possibility of easing U.S. sanctions on Venezuela might become an increasingly relevant point of discussion, as well as reshaping expectations of a region that projected
significant declines in oil production to comply
with the world’s goal to limit temperature increases to 1.5 degrees.

Russian media has been proactive in reinforcing
Moscow´s war rhetoric in LAC and mainstreaming positions favorable to the invasion that portray Ukraine and NATO as the aggressors. This
type of messaging has had a positive reception
with a diversity of ideological groups, mainly
the left-leaning sectors supportive of regimes
in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, as well as
conservative groups that perceive Putin´s agenda as one aligned with their own anti-globalist
ideals. As such, Russian war rhetoric continues
to be positively perceived by many in the region.
In early March 2022, Synopsis surveyed Argentines’ perception of the war in Ukraine and
Putin´s image.17 While 63 percent of responses
showed Putin having a bad or very bad image,
separation by political alignment showed that
supporters of the Frente de Todos’ (“Everyone´s
Front)) government coalition and leftist party
comprised the largest group of people with a
positive impression of Putin. In contrast, 86 percent of Juntos por el Cambio (United for Change)
voters had a negative view of the Kremlin chief.
A PoderData survey conducted in Brazil from
February 27 to March 1, 2022, showed that
Brazilians have a negative image of Russia.18
Fifty-six percent expressed a negative impression as opposed to the 6 percent that perceived
Putin positively. When breaking down support,
14 percent of Bolsonaro supporters positively
perceived Putin.
In a survey conducted by American University
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and CRIES (Regional Coordinator of Economic
and Social Research) among opinion leaders
before the war,19 Russia´s image was already
struggling. The survey also showed that more
than one-third of opinion leaders considered
China’s influence negative, while 32 percent
found it neutral, and a little more than 25 percent labeled it positive. Compared to other
powers, opinion leaders consider China’s influence, on average, the second most negative
after Russian influence in the region.
Prospects for Russian Cooperation
Before the Ukraine invasion, Russia had strived
for a new phase of regional engagement with
multiple actors beyond its traditional regional partners. In part, this was reflected by visits
from Argentina´s President Alberto Fernandez,
who expressed interest in Russia´s growing role
in the region and Argentina’s role as a “front
door to Latin America.”20
For many years, especially at the height of the
“pink tide,” Venezuela had served as a beachhead for Russian investments and cooperation, leading to a proactive involvement in the
country´s energy and defense sectors that
would later facilitate access to other regional
markets. Yet, economic and political conditions
in Venezuela have limited Russia’s possibilities
to increase its presence in the region. This has
become increasingly evident with President Joseph R. Biden’s administration exploring conditions for reengagement with Venezuela´s energy sector.
A recent shift in Maduro´s cabinet may serve as
an indicator and a message to Russia: former
Ambassador to Russia Carlos Faría has been
designated Foreign Affairs Minister.21 But this
was not reciprocated from the Russian side.
On May 27, the general director of the Russian
Kalashnikov arms consortium, Vladimir Lepin,
stated that the factory to produce AK-103 rifles and ammunition in Venezuela would not be
launched this year due to logistical problems.22
This comes after years of setbacks from the
Venezuelan side but also at a time when the
Venezuelan Armed Forces are in critical need
of rifles and ammunition to counter a growing
criminal insurgency.
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The invasion of Ukraine has created an enormous backlash against Russia´s diplomatic and
military plans in Latin America. Not only have
negative perceptions of Russia increased and
therefore tarnished the image of Russia as a
reliable partner among broad sectors of Latin
American society—including in countries with
left-leaning governments—prospects for access to Russian credit lines and investments
have been rendered unobtainable in the context of global sanctions. Additionally, the poor
performance of Russia´s military in Ukraine has
reinforced the notion among some sectors of
the region’s armed forces that Russian military
hardware is of inferior quality and does not
possess adequate manufacturer and logistical
support. This perception may condemn some
efforts from Russia to position its products, as
in the case of the Mig-35 offer to Argentina,
losing out to Chinese or U.S. offers.
As such, it is likely that, in the near future, prospects for cooperation in the region, especially
in the security and defense spheres, are limited
to already consolidated partnerships, such as
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The first has
reduced chances of notable cooperation due to
Cuba´s financial limitations, yet Nicaragua and
Venezuela could continue to perceive Russia as
one of its most reliable partners. In the case of
Venezuela, its already existing dependency on
Russian military hardware, training, and technical support in electronic warfare and intelligence means it is unlikely to have a strong shift,
at least regarding its military cooperation with
Russia. (Note that some segments of Russia´s
Army Games 2022 will take place in Venezuela). This is especially true as internal stabilization and counterinsurgency operations have
become a top priority for Maduro´s regime and
would require the technical support and knowhow it perceives Russia can offer.
Risk of a Latin American Flashpoint
The war in Ukraine started during an already
tense moment on the Venezuelan-Colombian
border. Since early 2022, the Venezuelan Armed
Forces have been conducting a large military
deployment in Apure state, bordering Colombia´s Arauca, to fight various para-state armed
organizations. While no official sources provide
quantitative data, open-source investigators
have shed light on the magnitude of the deployment. Inoperable until recently, FV101 Scorpi-
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ons have been locally refurbished and redeployed to the 91st Armored Cavalry Brigade in
Apure. These units then received support from
teams across Venezuelan territory, including
the deployment of two recently-created Reinforced Infantry Battalions—modeled after Russian Battalion Tactical Groups—along with Naval Commandos, Army Special Forces, Marines,
more than 50 pieces of towed artillery, mechanized infantry companies, SAR aircraft, close air
support planes, and other systems operated by
FANB. Overall, this deployment at times tripled
the size of Colombian deployments in the Arauca region.
This deployment not only reflected recent Russian doctrinal influence but also has a critical
element of direct Russian support in terms of
training military personnel, facilitating drone
operations, and providing valuable means and
know-how to conduct intelligence operations
on the border. This is of particular relevance as
U.S. military personnel are on the other side of
the Arauca River, which can be tracked via publicly-shared information by government forces
and the use of aircraft tracking software that
shows C-146A Wolfhound operations and increasingly frequent flights by RC-135W electronic intelligence aircraft over Colombian airspace.
Considering longstanding tensions on the Colombia-Venezuelan border that precede the
recent political and ideological differences between the two countries by many decades, and
the current lack of communications between
Colombian and Venezuelan armed forces in the
context of a drastic increase in military operations, the presence of extra-regional powers
supporting military operations on both sides
introduces a new dimension to regional conflict. As such, and especially in light of growing
Russian operations on the Venezuelan side of
the border, there is an increased risk that local
tension could obtain broader geopolitical relevance. Over time, the Arauca-Apure border or
even the general Colombia-Venezuela border
could become a flashpoint for U.S.-Russia geopolitical dispute. This scenario could be further
exacerbated by a consolidated Chinese presence in Venezuela and rapidly-growing technical and operational cooperation by the Venezuelan Armed Forces with Iran.

Opportunities
Russia´s presence in Latin America will continue
to have limitations. The main opportunity for the
United States to engage with the region is to
“fill the gaps” left by Russia´s shortcomings. As
such, facilitating access to investments in the
energy sector and other critical industries, such
as agriculture (including access to alternative
sources for necessary material and equipment),
can contribute to the long-term neutralization
of Russian strategic engagement.
More importantly, the war in Ukraine is undermining the perception of Russia as a reliable
military hardware provider. This opportunity is
not exclusive to the United States but also to
other military suppliers, including China. Tenders for combat aircraft, helicopters, air defense
systems, and other platforms have weakened
Russian offers, while China has already proven itself agile enough to seize such opportunities, as exemplified by Venezuelan contracts
for equipping its Marine Infantry Forces and the
Venezuelan Air Force. Still, the United States is
perceived as an overall reliable provider of military hardware, including post-sales support for
weapons systems. As such, a combination of
facilitated access to surplus military hardware
and participation in relevant tenders with soft
credits (as well as industrial offsets in cases
such as Argentina and Brazil) can provide the
United States with a competitive edge over other prospective providers in the region.
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